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THE INFORMER'S PRIVILEGE VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION:
A DOCTRINAL DILEMMA
LAWRENCE M. DUBIN
"The police are tipped off that a man carrying
narcotics will step off the morning train. A man
meeting the precise description does alight from
the train. No warrant for his arrest has been...
obtained. Yet he is arrested by federal agents; and
narcotics are found in his pocket and a syringe in
the bag he carried."'
The incriminating evidence is promptly seized
by the police. The arrestee is taken into custody
and charged with the illegal possession of narcotics.2 At a pre-trial hearing the defendant moves
to suppress the evidence, claiming it was seized
incident to an unlavful arrest. 3 The arrest is legal
if made upon probable cause, and the existence of
probable cause, in this situation, upon the tip of
an undisclosed infariner.
The defendant, relying on his right to confront
and cross-examine his accuser, demands disclosure
of the informant whose tip was used to establish
IStatement of facts in Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 315 (1959); quoted from the dissent of
Mr. Justice Douglas.
270 Stat. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C. §174 (Supp. V,
1958).
1 FFD. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). "A person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure may move...to suppress
for the use as evidence anything so obtained....The
motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless
opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant
was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the
court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the
trial or hearing."

probable cause. 4 The government, refusing to dis-

close either the source or contents of its information, claims it is privileged from disclosure.
This comment explores the interests of the informer, the government, and the accused in preserving or dispelling the mantle of secrecy surrounding the informer's disclosures and identity.
While framed in terms of federal law, the rights
referred to are protected at the state level as well.
Informers are widely used by police departments
and law enforcement agencies. Their services are
particularly useful, and indeed almost indispensable, in combating vice, gambling, and narcotics
violations. 6 By supplying the police with information about the identity and location of offenders
and offenses, or by taking part in pre-arranged
transactions, the informer often enables the police
'

U. S. CoNsT. amend. IV. "The right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing...the persons or things to be
seized." and: U. S. CONsT. amend. VI. "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."
IDonnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs 60 YALE IJ.

1091-95 (1951).
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to seize the offenders while they are perpetrating
the crime.
When an arrest is based on an informant's tip,
it is likely that the defense will demand a showing
of probable cause for the arrest and, in that connection, will insist on the right to confront the informer.; Satisfaction of these demands would
usually involve disclosure of the informer's identity. The prosecution's general opposition to disclosure of its sources of information has given rise
to the so-called "informer's privilege", which is in
fact the government's privilege to keep the informer secret. 8
The principal reason for the government's
privilege is to keep its sources fruitful. 9 Disclosure
of the informer would tend to scare off other informants and could affect the disclosed informer's
access to further information. In addition to the
government's reasons for maintaining secrecy, the
informer himself generally prefers anonymity to
insulate himself from possible retaliation and
derision.

0

aVOLLMER,

THE POLICE AND 'MODERN SOCIETY 8--1

87, 110-11 (1936).

IV, VI, supra note 4.
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
Some cases have held that the privilege extends to
the contents of the statement as well, but these cases
confuse this privilege with that protecting the informer
from slander suits in civil proceeding. In Vogel V.
Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884), plaintiff sued for slander
based on statements made by the defendant to the
state's attorney. The court held: "We are of the opinion that what was said by [the defendant] to [the
state's attorney], was an absolutely privileged communication....The avenue to the grand jury should
always be free....Any person...should not be deterred
by the fear of having what he may say...disclosed
afterwards in a cvil suit...." At 314, 315 (emphasis
added)
But the court was not content to limit itself to privileging the contents of the communication from disclosure in a civil proceeding and went on to say by
7 U. S. CoNsT. amends.
8

way of dictum: "Bia there is another view of the subject.

The matter concerns the administration of pena justice, and the principle of public safety justifies and
demands the rule of exclusion of the contents of the
communication....[Ilt is the duty of every citizen to
communicate to his government any information
which he has of the commission of an offense...and...a
court of justice will not compel or allow such information to be disclosed...by any person, without the permission of the government, the evidence being excluded
not for the protection of the witness...bt upon...public
policy, becauze of the confidential nature of such communications." At 316 (emphasis added).

9Roviaro v. United States, supra note 8.
ioThis may be rather dramatically illustrated by
the Schuster murder several years ago. A tip from one
Arnold Schuster led to the arrest of "Willie" Sutton,
a notorious bank robber. N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1952,
p. 1, col. 2. Less than a month later Schuster was shot
(lead on a N. Y. sidewalk, apparently the victim of a

On the other hand, the defendant's rights to
confront and cross-examine his accusers and to be
free from arrest but for probable cause, must weigh
at least as heavily as the interests of the informer
whose tip resulted in the arrest."

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE
OF THE INFORMER'S IDENTITY

Arrests made on tips from undisclosed informers
are usually executed without warrants. This is a
result, at least in part, of state and federal constitutional provisions prohibiting the issuance of
warrants without probable cause.'- The unverified
tip of an undisclosed informer is insufficient to fulfill the constitutional requirement.13 The quantum
revenge killing by friends of Sutton. N. Y. Times, Mar.
9, 1952, p. 1, col. 8. For further details see: Schuster
v. City of New York, 5 N.Y. 2d 75, 154 N.E. 2d 534
(1958). It is there suggested that the government owes
a positive duty to informers to protect them from
harm. In support of this point, see also: In re Quarles,
158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895), where the Supreme Court
said: "It is the right, as well as the duty of ever), citizen...to communicate...any information which he has
of an offense...and...it is the duty of government to see
that he may exercise this right freely, and to protect
him from violence while so doing, or on account of so
doing."
n United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D.
Ky. 1937).
2Protection comparable to that granted by the
fourth amendment (set out at note 4 supra) is found
in all state constitutions. 1 CARINGTON, COOLEY'S
CONSTITTIONAL LimTAnoNs 615 (8th ed. 1927). In

addition, the fourth amendment itself is applicable in
state prosecutions through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U. S.25, 27-28 (1949).
13United States v. Reynolds, 111 F. Supp. 589
(D.D.C. 1953). Defendant was arrested for illegal
possession of narcotics. At trial he moved to suppress
evidence on the ground that it was seized pursuant to
a search warrant issued without probable cause. The
challenged warrant was issued upon the arresting
officer's affidavit that he had received information
from a previously reliable source that the defendant
was a known narcotics peddler and had stored a large
quantity of narcotics in his house. Prior to the arrest
the officer ascertained that the defendant did have a
record of narcotics violations and did own the premises
to be searched. The officer declined to disclose the
identity of his source, asserting non-disclosure was
essential to the informer's safety. The court held the
warrant bad for lack of probable cause. "The peace
officer...should state in his affidavit the facts which
led him to [the] conclusion, and which were known to
him of his own knowledge. If he has no first-hand infor-

mation as to the material facts, but has been informed
by another as to facts or conditions which would justify the issuance of process for search or seizure, the
officer should secure the informer's affidavit positively
alleging of the latter's own knowledge the existence of
such facts or conditions. In the event that the informer is unwilling to make such an affidavit, he should
be subpoenaed to appear before the judge or.comnis-
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of evidence necessary to support the warrant only
exists, if at all, after the tip has been acted upon
and thereby corroborated-but this is often the
point at which the arrest is made.
No case has yet allowed an arrest to be upheld
on the mere charge of an informer without knowl-
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mere possession is a criminal offense, e.g., narcotics. 21 To allow an obviously guilty defendant

to go free on the ground that there was no probable
cause for his arrest admittedly seems to strain the
meaning of fair play.
However, in many cases the success of the arrest
edge of his prior reliability or without subsequent is unquestionably used as verification of the tip
verification of his information. 4 What constitutes or to establish the reliability of the informer. This
reliability and verification, however, may be more is error. Legal doctrine is clear. An arrest without
a matter of definition than a matter of fact. The warrant is valid only in a situation requiring imcourts seem reluctant to separate the tip from the mediate action upon probable cause which is
verification thereof. Consequently, a police officer, sufficient for a warrant to issue." Verification and
acting upon a tip from an informer whose relia- reliability cannot be established by mere coincibility is believed by him, may make an arrest
dence. They must rest upon information gathered
alleging as probable cause some innocent act co- prior to the arrest.2 A contrary position is an
inciding with the tip.' 5 An arrest thus executed is admission that the fruits of a successful search
6
4
held to have been made upon probable cause.1
may validate an arrest illegal in its inception.2
These "otherwise innocent" acts may consist of
Faced with this dash of doctrine and fact, the
walking "real fast" when leaving a train," driving courts have not always interpreted the doctrine of
a heavily loaded car,"' sliding closed packages on probable cause so liberally. The position has been
a wooden surface, 9 or getting into a car with two taken that the quality of the evidence necessary
adults and a child 20 Each of these seemingly inno- to establish probable cause must meet that standcent acts was in fact part of a criminal transaction ard required in a trial on the merits. 2 5 This elimidisclosed by an arrest and search. It should be nated the hearsay of undisclosed informers, 8 and
noted, however, that each arrest was made on the demanded a greater degree of investigation subsestrength of an informer's tip and that the de- quent to the tip but prior to the arrest. The strict
scribed act was the only verification of the tip.
view taken in these decisions was severely critiThe inability or refusal of the courts to separate cized as putting an undue burden on the police
the tip from the subsequent confirming events is and certainly the criticism was not without justipartially explained by the often obvious guilt of fication.? On the other hand, the position was an
the arrestee--particularly in those situations where
21 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C. §174 (Supp. V, 1958).
2
Wrightson v. United States, 222 F. 2d 556, 559
sioner to give testimony as to the truth of the state- (D. C. Cir. 1955). See also: Henry v. United States,
ments made by him to the commissioner." (emphasis 28 U.S.L. WEEIx 4015 (U. S. Nov. 23, 1959). Draper
added) See also: 14 A.L.R. 2d 605 (1950).
does not abandon this doctrine but expands, by impli14'
United States v. Reynolds, supra note 13.
cation, the circumstances upon which a warrant may
"5In Draper v. United States, supra note 1, the be obtained to include the tip of an informer whose
officer acted on the tip of an informer he believed to previous reliability can be established to the satisfaction
be reliable, and the arrest, search, and seizure were of the court. Cervantes v. United States, 263 F. 2d
upheld as having been made on probable cause. How- 800 (9th Cir. 1959). It would appear that disclosure of
ever, in Draper, the identity of the informer was dis- the informant's identity would be necessary to estabclosed and available to the defendant. Cf. Jones v. lish his reliability. Jones v. United States, supra note
United States, 266 F. 2d 924 (D. C. Cir. 1959), where 15. Jones has been granted leave to appeal. When deCircuit Judge Bazelon, in stating his reasons for allow- cided, this case may settle whether disclosure of the
ing the movant to appeal in forma pauperis, interprets informer's identity is necessary to establish reliability.
Draper in light of Roviaro (supra note 8) as standing
"Wrightson
v. United States, supra note 22.
4
for the proposition that, when there is no probable
2 See notes 17-20 supra. Had the search in any of
cause for an arrest other than the tip of an informer these cases proved fruitless, there can be little doubt
believed to be reliable by the police, the identity of that a civil action for false arrest could not have been
the informer must be disclosed in order that his relia- successfully defended on the ground of probable cause
bility be subjected to judicial scrutiny rather than that for the arrest. The conclusion is inescapable that but
of a policeman.
for the success of the search there would be no probable
16United States v. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 441, 442 cause. The arrests, therefore, must have been illegal in
(D.D.C. 1953).
the inception.
7Draper v. United States, supra note 1.
15Worthington v. United States, 166 F. 2d 557,
IsUnited States v. Nichols, 78 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.
564 (6th Cir. 1948).
21 Ibid.
Ark. 1948).
= Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-5
19Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
20United States v. Walker, 246 F. 2d 519 (7th Cir.
(1949). Criticizing generally the basis of the Worthing1957).
ton decision (supra note 25) the court said in a footnote
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understandable reaction to those courts that accepted the slimmest reeds of verification offered in
the support of probable cause.
Of course not all cases involving undisclosed
informers contain so many traps for an unwary
court. Where the tip of the informer is used solely
as a jumping-off point for investigation leading to
an independent determination of probable cause,
there is probably no way in which the defendant
can compel disclosure of the informer. In these
cases probable cause depends upon facts known to
the police through their senses and not upon the
informer's tip.2 The fact that the investigation
was instigated by the tip of an informer would be
immaterial and irrelevant, as well as against
government policy.2 There need be no probable
cause for surveillance. 30
"The inappropriateness of applying the rules of evidence as a criterion to determine probable cause is
apparent in the case of an application for a warrant
before a magistrate, the context in which the issue of
probable cause most frequently arises. The ordinary
rules of evidence are generally not applied in ex parte
proceedings... 'partly because the judge's determination is usually discretionary, partly because it is seldom
final, but mainly because the system of Evidence rules
was devised for the special control of trials by jury' ....
(D)ictum that '(a) search warrant may issue only upon
evidence which would be competent in the trial of the
offense before a jury. . . '[was a] proposition [for which]
there was no authority in the decisions of this Court."
The court did, however, recognize that the criticized
dictum has been the basis for decision in cases before
the Courts of Appeals and District Courts. These decisions were not overruled, but obviously failed to impress
the Supreme Court.
2 Mc Quaid v. United States, 198. F. 2d 987 (D.C.
Cir. 1952). Police officers, acting on a tip that appellant
was in possession of stolen goods, went to appellant's
second-hand store where they observed goods fitting
the description of those stolen. Upon inquiry, appellant
at first denied but later admitted having more goods
fitting the description of those stolen. Appellant also
told the officers that records required to be kept by
appellant's type of business were unavailable. In refusing to require disclosure of the identity of the informer whose tip led to the discovery of the stolen
merchandise, the court stated: "The legality of the officers' action does not depend upon the credibility of
something told but upon what they saw and heardwhat took place in their presence. Justification is not
sought because of honest belief based upon credible
information... "
-Scher v. United States, supra note 19 at 254. Officers arrested appellant after receiving a tip that he
would be transporting bootleg whiskey and after observing and bearing appellant loading heavy packages
into his car. The court held that the arrest was made
observaindependent
by this
cause gathered
upon
the
holding with
to bolster
but felt obliged
tion, probable
statement: "Moreover, as often pointed out, public
policy forbids disclosure of an inform-. 's identity unless
essential to the defense, as, for example, where this
turns upon an officer's good faith."
30Donnelly, supra note 5 at 1096.

Another class of cases is that in which the informer participates in the crime.3 ' Because of his
participation, the informer can be considered a
material witness, and failure to disclose his identity
would be a denial of due process.- The penalty
for nondisclosure is usually dismissal of the case,33
and, in at least one instance, failure of the officer
to disclose the informer's identity when so ordered
by the court resulted in his being cited for contempt.n
CoNcLusIoN
Generally the accused may compel disclosure of
the informer's identity by making the informer
material to his defense.3 5 Materiality may be established by a timely motion to suppress evidence
as having been ilegally seized6 or by attacking the
reliability of the informer-" or the good faith of
31A frequently employed defense in participation
cases is entrapment. Vhen entrapment is alleged, confrontation -ill almost certainly be granted. Even when
not alleged by defense counsel, the court has been
known to suggest the possibility of entrapment and
remand with orders to disclose the identity of the informant so as to determine the rights of the defendant,
e.g., Roviaro v. United States, supra note 8 at 64.
"His [the informer's] testimony might have disclosed an
entrapment." (emphasis added) Entrapment was not
a defense asserted by appellant. (dissent of Mr. Justice
Clark, id. at 69.)
n Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F. 2d 627, 628629 (9th Cir. 1947). "If the person.. . called an informer bad been an informer and nothing more, appellant would not have been entitled to have his identity
disclosed; but the person... called an informer was
something more. He was the person to whom appellant
was said to have sold and dispensed the opium described
in the indictment. Information as to this person's identity was therefore material to appellant's defense, and
appellant was cntitled to a disclosure thereof."
- Roviaro v. United States, supra note 8 at 60-61.
"Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of
the contents of his communication, is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a
fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way. In these situations the trial court may require
disclosure and, if the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action."
mWilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.
1932). But see: United States v. Keown, supra note
11, where the court, recognizing the contempt to be
that of the agent-witness's superiors, simply dismissed
the case.
358 WiMoRE, EvIDE.CE §2374(4) (3d ed. 1940).
"Even where the privilege is strictly applicable, the
trialcourt may compel disclosure, if it appears necessary
in order to avoid the risk of false testimony or to secure
useful testimony." Compare: United States v. Li Fat
Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
36 FED. R. CRius. P. 41(e), supra note 3.

7 United States v. Keown, supra note 11 at 645.
"If the information of the informer was unreliable or

he was unworthy of belief, the officer did not have
probable cause to make either the search or the arrest."
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the officer testifying tlhereto. 38 These elements may
well be the Achilles heel of the prosecution and
should be challenged at every level, from the preliminary hearing to the last appeal.
The principle of materiality has been recognized
in some of the more recent decisions. 39 Rather than
adhere to one rule or another, the courts have, in
these, attempted to take the cases as they come,
balancing the defendant's rights in each against
the government's interest in concealing the informant's identity. This has resulted in the
anomalous position that the strength of the law
is, in this area, reposed in indecision, for the courts
which follow this middle-of-the-road approach
must haunt the over-zealous police officer with the
United States v. Nichols, supra note 18 at 487.
9 Roviaro v. United States, supra note 8 at 62. "We
believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is
justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing
the public interest in protecting the flow of information
against the individual's right to prepare his defense.
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of
each case, taking into consideration the crime charged,
the possible defenses, the possible significance of the
informer's testimony, and other relevant factors."
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spectre of having to produce the informer or watch
his case dissolve for want of a probable cause.
Despite the anomaly, this appears to be the best
solution offered thus far. It must be recognized,
however, that any holding allowing the informer's
accusations to go unchallenged is an abdication of
judicial responsibility and must, to some degree,
leave the final determination of probable cause to
the mind of the arresting officer in what amounts
to an ex parte proceeding devoid of the safeguards
provided in a judicial hearing. At the same time,
such a holding invites and allows circumvention
of both the fourth amendment mandate as to
probable cause and the sixth amendment guarantee
4
to the right of confrontation of witnesses. 1
40The defendant is afforded the protection of the
sixth amendment implicitly through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment subject to the
limitation that the defendant's right to be present bears
a reasonably substantial relation to his defense. Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). This would undoubtedly protect the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against the defendant. In any case,
this protection is also granted by all state constitutions.
1 CARRINGTON, op. cit. supra note 12 at 666.

